文化差異即是指因地區(qū)異同，各地區(qū)人們所特有的文化異同而產生的差異?；舴蛩固固卣J為:文化是在一個環(huán)境中的人們共同的心理程序，不是一種個體特征，而是具有相同的教育和生活經驗的許多人所共有的心理程序。下面就由小編給大家?guī)黻P于中美文化的不同英語作文，希望能夠對大家有所幫助！

　　關于中美文化的不同英語作文篇一

　　文化差異何其大 美國為何難以理解中國

　　Do the events that led to the outbreak of the first world war carry lessons for the Sino-American relationship? A century ago it was the ascent of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm I thatunsettled the world; today a rising China is roiling east Asia. Then, as now, domestic politicson both sides played a role; one that is too easily neglected.

　　導致一戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)的事件對中美關系有什么啟發(fā)意義嗎?一個世紀以前，德國在威廉一世(Kaiser Wilhelm I)領導下的崛起讓世界感到不安;如今，中國的崛起讓東亞感到不安。當時和現(xiàn)在一樣，對立雙方的國內政治都發(fā)揮了作用——這是一個太容易被人們忽視的因素。

　　Why did Britain and Germany – linked by trade, dynastic ties, culture and religion – findthemselves at war in August 1914? In part, as historian Paul Kennedy has argued, it wasbecause London’s liberal ideology contributed to its perception of a growing German threat.

　　1914年8月，存在貿易、王朝紐帶、文化和宗教聯(lián)系的英國和德國為何開戰(zhàn)?從某種程度上來說，正如歷史學家保羅肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)所指出的，那是因為倫敦的自由主義意識形態(tài)強化了其關于德國威脅日益加劇的認識。

　　Filtered through liberalism’s lens, Germany looked militarist, autocratic, mercantilist and statist– and contempt for the country’s political culture added to London’s disquiet. When the warbegan, it quickly came to be seen as a liberal crusade against “Prussianism”.

　　透過自由主義“棱鏡”，德國給人看到的是軍國主義、獨裁、重商主義和計劃經濟——而對該國政治文化的鄙視也增加了倫敦的不安。當戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)時，人們立刻將之視為一場討伐“普魯士主義”的自由主義戰(zhàn)爭。

　　In this respect, today’s Sino-American rivalry resembles the pre-1914 Anglo-Germanantagonism. The speed of China’s growth worries US policy makers, as do the geopoliticalimplications of its economic transformation.

　　從這個方面來說，當今的中美對抗類似于1914年以前的英德對抗。中國的發(fā)展速度讓美國政策制定者感到擔憂，其經濟改革對地緣政治的影響同樣讓美國不安。

　　Across the American political spectrum, China’s success is attributed to its failure to play bythe rules of free trade – for instance, its habit of manipulating the value of its currency andengaging in industrial espionage. Market-oriented liberalism is the dominant ideology in theUS and, as in pre-1914 Britain, it shapes policy makers’ image of their supposed adversary.

　　在美國政界上下看來，中國的成功得益于其沒有遵守自由貿易規(guī)則，例如慣于操縱匯率，以及從事工業(yè)間諜活動。以市場為導向的自由主義是美國的主要意識形態(tài)，而正如1914年前的英國一樣，它決定了政策制定者對他們所以為的對手的印象。

　　American leaders view China as a nation whose undemocratic political system raises doubtsabout both the scope of its foreign policy ambitions and its trustworthiness as a diplomaticpartner. Moreover, China’s combination of political authoritarianism and state-directedcapitalism causes unease because it challenges the supposed universality of the Americanmodel of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.

　　在美國領導人的眼里，中國不民主的政治體制令人懷疑其外交政策雄心的范圍，以及其作為外交合作伙伴的可信賴性。此外，中國政治威權主義與國家資本主義的結合令人不安，原因是它挑戰(zhàn)了美國模式的自由主義民主和自由市場資本主義的所謂普適性。

　　Aaron Friedberg, a Princeton University professor, says that for Americans, “the success of amainland [Chinese] regime that blends authoritarian rule with market-driven economics is anaffront.” For members of the US foreign-policy elite, the Chinese threat is not so muchgeopolitical as ideological.

　　普林斯頓大學(Princeton University)的阿龍弗里德伯格(Aaron Friedberg)教授表示，在美國人看來，“中國大陸政權將威權統(tǒng)治和市場導向的經濟學結合在一起所取得的成功是一種侮辱”。對美國上層外交政策制定者來說，中國威脅更多是意識形態(tài)層面的，而不是地緣政治上的。

　　Powerful external and domestic forces are putting the US and China on the road toconfrontation. China aspires to be the regional hegemon in east (and southeast) Asia. The US– the incumbent hegemon, having dominated the region since 1945 – is blocking its path.

　　各種強有力的內外因素正把美中推上對抗之路。中國渴望成為東亞(以及東南亞)地區(qū)的霸主，而自1945年以來主導該地區(qū)的現(xiàn)任霸主美國則攔在路上。

　　Yet America’s predominance in east Asia contributes little to the security of a nation whosegeography and unsurpassed military capabilities would anyway make it close to invulnerable.The US is the most secure great power in history – even more so if you factor in thedeterrent effect of nuclear weapons. The true cause of American insecurity is not animminent encroachment on its territory but the risk that US alliances – especially with Japan –will draw it into a regional conflict.

　　然而，在東亞地區(qū)的主導地位并不會讓美國更安全——不管怎樣，美國所處的地理位置和擁有的無可匹敵的軍事能力讓其處于一種近乎無懈可擊的狀態(tài)。美國是歷史上最安全的大國——如果你考慮到核武器的威懾作用，就會更肯定這一點。美國真正的.不安全因素不是其疆域會遭到入侵，而是同盟關系——尤其是美日同盟——將其拖入地區(qū)沖突的風險。

　　The US wants to maintain its east Asian dominance to keep the region’s markets open toAmerican goods and its people open to liberal ideas. China threatens this openness, on whichAmerica’s security is wrongly believed to depend.

　　美國希望保持在東亞地區(qū)的主導地位，以讓該地區(qū)的市場繼續(xù)向美國商品開放，其民眾繼續(xù)接受自由主義思想的熏陶。中國威脅到了這種開放，而美國的安全被錯誤地以為依賴于這種開放。

　　The liberal assumptions embedded in American foreign policy put the US at odds with China,and also heighten Beijing’s mistrust of Washington’s intentions and ambitions. The spiral ofanimosity that threatens to culminate in a confrontation between the two countries is inlarge part a creation of American policy.

　　美國外交政策中蘊含的自由主義思想導致美國與中國立場不一致，也加深了北京方面對華盛頓意圖和抱負的不信任感。這種不斷增長的、有可能在兩國對抗中達到頂峰的敵意，在很大程度上是美國政策導致的。

　　As China’s rises, Washington has a last clear chance to avoid the looming Sino-Americanconflict.

　　在中國的崛起過程中，美國有最后的避讓機會，可以避免不斷迫近眼前的中美沖突真正爆發(fā)。

　　This would entail making real concessions on Taiwan and on China’s territorial claims in the Eastand South China Seas. It would also involve a commitment that Washington would notinterfere in China’s internal affairs.

　　這需要美國在臺灣xx以及中國涉及東中國海和南中國海的領土主張上做出真正的妥協(xié)。此外美國也需承諾不干預中國內部事務。

　　America’s political culture – based on exceptionalism, liberal ideology, and openness – is a bigobstacle to coming to terms with a resurgent China. So is the fact that the foreign-policy eliteremains wedded to American primacy, and refuses to accept that this will inevitably slip awaybecause of the relative decline of US power.

　　美國建立在例外主義、自由主義思想和開放觀念等基礎之上的政治文化，是影響美國接受復興的中國的一大障礙。另一個障礙是，美國外交政策圈子中的精英們依然癡迷于“美國主導地位”，并拒絕接受這種地位隨著美國實力相對衰落必將喪失的觀點。

　　History is also a problem.

　　歷史也是一個問題

　　US policy makers are quick to invoke what they take to be the lessons of the 1930s whileoverlooking the causes of the first world war. David Calleo, a professor at Johns Hopkins, hasobserved that what we should learn from the earlier conflict “is not so much the need forvigilance against aggressors, but the ruinous consequences of refusing reasonableaccommodation to upstarts”.

　　美國政策制定者迅速擺出他們從上世紀30年代事件中歸納的教訓，卻無視一戰(zhàn)的起因。約翰斯-霍普金斯大學(Johns Hopkins University)的戴維卡萊奧(David Calleo)教授指出，我們應該從更早那場沖突中學到的主要教訓，“不是必須警惕侵略者，而是拒絕合理包容新崛起者將帶來破壞性后果”。

　　If the US wants to avoid a future conflict with China, it cannot allow liberal ideology toobstruct a reconciliation with an ever more powerful China. That is the real lesson of 1914.

　　如果美國想要避免未來與中國發(fā)生沖突，就不能讓自由主義意識形態(tài)妨礙它與越來越強大的中國修好。這是1914年帶給我們的真正教訓。